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The "Economic" Analysis of
Transnational Mergers
WILLIAM JAMES ADAMS

No congregation of lawyers can be considered complete
without a token economist. The role of the economist consists of describing
the economic mode of analyzing the legal problem under consideration. Unfortunately from the standpoint of the token, economists rarely agree on
criteria appropriate for the appraisal of economic phenomena. With respect to
transnational corporate mergers, four modes of analysis may be described
legitimately as economic.
Two of the modes of analysis should be familiar to all members of the
antitrust bar. The first of these might be called "competition as a quasi goal
of society." It is based on this argument: In a market economy, it is impossible to achieve economic efficiency in the absense of competition in relevant
markets. Moreover, competition is compatible with, perhaps even conducive
to, the realization of other social goals such as decentralization of political,
economic, and social power. Given the difficulty of measuring directly the
true elements of social performance, the state of competition in relevant
markets can safely be considered a proxy for them.
Reasoning of this sort appears frequently in U.S. judicial opinions discussing the antitrust laws. Such reasoning would lead the student of transnational mergers to investigate the effects of such mergers on the state of
competition in relevant markets-principally those found in the countries of
the acquiring and acquired firms.
A great deal of research of this sort has been performed-at least on the
theoretical plane.' Unsurprisingly, transnational mergers are seen to have
both desirable and undesirable effects on the state of competition. To understand why, imagine an industry in country A organized as a tightly knit
oligopoly comprised exclusively of mononational firms. Now imagine acquisition of one of the oligopolists by a large firm domiciled in country B and
engaged in the same line of business. On the one hand, the transnational
merger might destabilize comfortable oligopolistic agreements in country A.
This article is adapted from a presentation made by Professor Adams at the Symposium
on Transnational Corporate Concentration held at the University of Michigan Law
School on November 9 and 10, 1979. Professor Adams is associate professor of economics and law at the University of Michigan.
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The multinational firm has wider horizons than do its mononational counterparts. As a result, the kinds of behavior which it finds desirable may be
anathema to the mononationals. Even if the two types of firms have the same
goals, cognitive differences between firms heterogeneous in nationality may
render collusion less successful than it might otherwise be. On the other
hand, this transnational merger might elevate barriers to new competition in
both countries. If the multinational firm is large in relation to the mononational firms in country A, it might operate as a giant among pygmiesmaking entry into that market distinctly less attractive than it would have
been otherwise. If the multinational firm's rivals in country B perceive a need
to match the initiated integration pattern, 2 then potential entrants into market B may feel the ante necessary to enter the industry there has been
elevated. For these reasons, among others, the net effect of the transnational
merger on the state of competition is ambiguous.
Not all economists embrace the view that competition should always be
treated as a desideratum. The dissenters frequently reason that although
competition is needed to guarantee efficiency in the allocation of resources
among industries, competition can be incompatible with efficiency in the
production of particular goods. If technology exhibits increasing returns to
scale over wide ranges of output, then large market shares may be needed to
produce at low unit-cost. Moreover, market power may be conducive to rapid
technological change. In such situations, the gains in efficiency associated
with competition must be compared with the losses in efficiency-static and
dynamic-associated with competition.
Competition itself is desirable only
3
when the benefits exceed the costs.
This view may be called the competition for the sake of efficiency mode
of analysis. It pervades the decisions rendered in European antitrust proceedings. Such a view suggests that transnational mergers should be evaluated
on the basis of direct evidence regarding their impact on economic efficiency.
Evidence of this type can be found in the literature on multinational corporations. Some such evidence bears on whether multinational or mononational
corporations should be considered the better managed. Other such evidence
bears on the extent to which multinational corporations facilitate the international diffusion of advanced technology and labor skills. 4 Still other evidence

bears on the extent to which efficient scales of operation are attained more
often by multinational than by mononational companies.
If we confine our attention to the written decisions of antitrust authorities, these are the two types of economic analysis we find. However, the
written decisions fail to convey an accurate impression of the kinds of economic issues on which many decisions turn. The discerning reader will find
two other types of analysis lurking in the shadows; the concealed arguments
weigh more heavily in the outcomes than do their more obvious counterparts.
As a result, it would be a mistake to characterize the difference between U.S.
and European views on mergers in general, and transnational mergers in
particular, as being the treatment of competition as an end versus the treat-
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ment of competition as a means for achieving economic efficiency. Certain
economic doctrines motivate European antitrust policy.
The first of these focuses on questions of distribution. In one form or
another, the argument comes down to this: direct foreign investment changes the international distribution of income. To the extent that national governments care only about incomes accruing to their own citizens, they
should favor or oppose transnational mergers on the basis of whether their
own citizens are likely to gain or lose income from the transaction.
Among the key economic questions associated with this position are
where does the acquiring company obtain the funds needed to finance the
transnational merger, what do the sellers of the acquired firm do with the
money they receive from the buyers, and what will the acquiring company do
with the cash flow of the acquired company? These questions cannot be
answered satisfactorily until particular transnational mergers have been
studied in great detail.
The fourth economic framework for analyzing transnational mergers,
like the third, does not focus on the impact of such mergers on economic
efficiency. Rather it focuses on the ability of national governments to implement national economic policies. The argument runs like this: national governments are responsible for the welfare of their constituents; they devise
and attempt to implement economic policies accordingly. Inevitably, at some
point during the process of implementation, governments must rely on the
business community. The business community must exhibit two characteristics-admittedly, characteristics difficult to realize simultaneously-if it is to
be helpful to government. On the one hand, some firms in each industrial
sector should possess market power sufficient to ensure the capability of
accomplishing governmental goals. On the other hand, despite their power,
such firms should remain sufficiently dependent on governmental favors to
ensure that they will act in the public interest.
This may be designated the dirigiste approach to the evaluation of
mergers. I believe that it, and, to a lesser extent, the distributional mode of
analysis, are used extensively in European antitrust affairs. How else can one
explain the attempts of several European governments to create national
champions-domestic firms large enough to fight their governments' battles
in various market arenas? 5 Surely the desire to ensure productive efficiency
cannot be considered a plausible answer. Such a policy would prompt attempts
to merge small- and medium-size enterprises-not the largest of oligopolists.
If distributional and dirigiste modes of analysis prevail in Europe, then
the following three observations are in order. First, no amount of evidence
regarding economic efficiency in general, or economies of scale in particular,
will suffice to determine how a European government will choose to treat
particular mergers. If economists wish to influence such treatment, they will
have to investigate more fully the effects of transnational mergers on the
ability of national governments to implement national economic policies.
Studies of the following types of questions would be needed: What kinds of
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industrial structures permit firms to execute governmental economic policies
successfully? In particular, is great seller concentration necessary? If so, is it
sufficient? Second, what kinds of policy instruments must the government
wield in order to insure that it can induce firms to behave in the public
interest? For example, is the creation of governmental enterprises in key
sectors of the economy helpful? Is it necessary? What are the key sectors of
the economy in this context?
In effect, what economists must do is assess the cost-effectiveness of
dirigiste economic policy. My own feeling is that dirigiste governments, for
example, the French, have paid a high price for reliance on large firms to
execute their economic policies. 6 In the first place, I suspect that the price
has been high in pecuniary terms. Great market power is often accompanied
by great political power. As a result, the firm most able to satisfy governmental desires is the firm most able to extract a handsome quid pro quo. In
breeding firms resistant to the powers of competition, governments may well
have been breeding firms resistant to governmental control. In the second
place, I fear that the political price of the dirigiste strategy may be even
larger than the pecuniary price. As the formulators of economic policy begin
to rely heavily on large business corporations, they begin to rely less heavily
on the organs of government. To the extent that governmental institutions
are responsible de facto to all citizens, and to the extent that business enterprises are not so responsible, dirigiste economic policy saps the strength of
political democracy. In this connection, it is ominous to note that many of the
of indicative planning now consider it to be excessively
original proponents
7
elitist in practice.
My second observation relates to the question of whether or not transnational mergers are likely to be controlled soon by some transnational authority. As much as ever, national governments see the need for national economic policies. In no small measure, this need may be attributed to the
rapidity and force with which macroeconomic disturbances are transmitted
across national frontiers.' Until supranational institutions succeed in creating
a stable economic order for the world, national governments are unlikely to
surrender their most potent methods of controlling their economies. There is
some reason to believe that, rightly or wrongly, many governments consider
the control of mergers to be one such method. The unwillingness of the
Council of the European Communities to grant broad authority to control
mergers to the European Commission is certainly consistent with such a
view. In any event, those who would control multinational corporations via
supranational authorities should be concerned more with an international
macroeconomic policy than with international antitrust laws or codes of conduct for transnational corporations, for only through a consideration of a
nation's macroeconomic concerns can supranational institutions deal effectively with problems of transnational corporate concentration.
Finally, it is obvious that different modes of economic analysis can lead
to different conclusions regarding the desirability of particular transnational
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mergers. It is important, therefore, that governments choose wisely among
the economic criteria already discussed. Unfortunately, until government
officials declare openly that factors other than economic efficiency and competition affect the desirability of mergers, economists-prone as they are to
take official pronouncements at face value-will not conduct the relevant
empirical research. And policy makers, observing no evidence to contradict
the wisdom of their decisions regarding transnational mergers, may unwittingly tread a path which does not serve the public interest.
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